Most people would agree that a small child, or a cognitively impaired
adult, is less responsible for their actions, good or bad, than an
unimpaired adult. But how do we explain that difference, and how far can
anyone be praised or blamed for what they have done?
In this fascinating introduction, Matthew Talbert explores some of the
key questions shaping current debates about moral responsibility,
including: What is free will, and is it required for moral
responsibility? Are we responsible for the unforeseen consequences of
our actions? Is it fair to blame people for doing what they believe is
right? And are psychopaths open to blame?
As Talbert argues, we are morally responsible for our actions when they
are related to us in particular ways: when our actions express our true
selves, for example, or when we exercise certain kinds of control over
them. It is because we bear these relationships to our actions that we
are open to praise and blame.
Moral Responsibility will be an important resource for students and
researchers in ethics, moral psychology, and philosophy of agency and of
great interest to all those wishing to understand an important aspect of
our moral practices.