We can see a theft, hear a lie, and feel a stabbing. These are morally
important perceptions. But are they also moral
perceptions--distinctively moral responses? In this book, Robert Audi
develops an original account of moral perceptions, shows how they figure
in human experience, and argues that they provide moral knowledge. He
offers a theory of perception as an informative representational
relation to objects and events. He describes the experiential elements
in perception, illustrates moral perception in relation to everyday
observations, and explains how moral perception justifies moral
judgments and contributes to objectivity in ethics.
Moral perception does not occur in isolation. Intuition and emotion may
facilitate it, influence it, and be elicited by it. Audi explores the
nature and variety of intuitions and their relation to both moral
perception and emotion, providing the broadest and most refined
statement to date of his widely discussed intuitionist view in ethics.
He also distinguishes several kinds of moral disagreement and assesses
the challenge it poses for ethical objectivism.
Philosophically argued but interdisciplinary in scope and interest,
Moral Perception advances our understanding of central problems in
ethics, moral psychology, epistemology, and the theory of the emotions.
