This work provides details and analysis of the intelligence failures and
successes of the Cuban Missile Crisis, and suggests some lessons learned
for the collection, analysis, and use of intelligence in strategic
decision making. It tells how the crisis unfolded using the author's
personal recollection, declassified documents, and many memoirs written
by senior CIA officers and other participants. Lessons learned include
the need to avoid having our political, analytical and intelligence
collection mind-sets prevent us from acquiring and accurately analyzing
information about our adversary's plans and intentions. When our
national security is at stake, we should not hesitate to undertake risky
intelligence collection operations including espionage, to penetrate our
adversary's deceptions. We must also understand that our adversaries may
not believe the gravity of our policy warnings or allow their own
agendas to be influenced by diplomatic pressure. (Originally published
by the Strategic Studies Institute)