As Clausewitz observed, In war more than anywhere else, things do not
turn out as we expect. The essence of war is a competitive reciprocal
relationship with an adversary. Commanders and institutional leaders
must recognize shortfalls and resolve gaps rapidly in the middle of the
fog of war. The side that reacts best (and absorbs faster) increases its
chances of winning.
Mars Adapting examines what makes some military organizations better
at this contest than others. It explores the institutional
characteristics or attributes at play in learning quickly. Adaptation
requires a dynamic process of acquiring knowledge, the utilization of
that knowledge to alter a unit's skills, and the sharing of that
learning to other units to integrate and institutionalize better
operational practice.
Mars Adapting explores the internal institutional factors that promote
and enable military adaptation. It employs four cases, drawing upon one
from each of the U.S. armed services. Each case was an extensive
campaign, with several cycles of action/counteraction. In each case, the
military institution entered the war with an existing mental model of
the war they expected to fight. For example, the U.S. Navy prepared for
decades to defeat the Japanese Imperial Navy and had developed
carried-based aviation. Other capabilities, particularly the Fleet
submarine, were applied as a major adaptation.
The author establishes a theory called Organizational Learning Capacity
that captures the transition of experience and knowledge from
individuals into larger and higher levels of each military service
through four major steps. The learning/change cycle is influenced, he
argues, by four institutional attributes (leadership, organizational
culture, learning mechanisms, and dissemination mechanisms). The dynamic
interplay of these institutional enablers shaped their ability to
perceive and change appropriately.
