I first became interested in the relationship between Locke's anti-
essentialism and his theory of identity in a first-year graduate course
on metaphysics taught at Syracuse University by Jose Benardete. I had
until then approached Locke as a "safe", commonsense philosopher, whose
metaphysical agenda-constrained as it was by his concept empiricism- was
largely geared towards upholding a scientifically enlightened, broadly
Christian worldview. I am greatly indebted to Professor Benardete for
disabusing me of this understanding of Locke's work. Benardete's Locke
was not the Locke that I had been exposed to as an undergraduate, not
the Locke that I had found in Copleston's History of Philosophy. Rather,
he was a profoundly creative and audacious metaphysician, who was justly
perceived to be a tremendously dangerous philosopher by his more
traditional contemporarie s. And as much I had admired Copleston's
Locke, I have become positively enthralled with Benardete's. The topics
of identity and essentialism have become mainstays of contemporary
metaphysics, and it is no understatement to say that Locke's
contribution to modem debates on these matters is enormous. My early
interest in Locke's work on essentialism and identity-through-time was
motivated by two factors. First, although there are a number of obvious
and significant conceptual connections between these topics, Locke's own
theorizing about identity seems not to have been informed by his
critique of essentialism or vice versa.
