Can we reasonably speak of 'linguistic realities'? Do theoretical
linguists devise accounts of a reality which exists outside of their
theories? In this provocative and insightful study of the philosophy of
linguistics, the author first investigates the realist/instrumentalist
debate in the philosophy of science, and shows what relevance it has for
the sort of questions linguists might ask themselves about the nature of
their discipline. He proposes a realist philosophy of linguistics, which
takes as its starting point Popper's falsificationist philosophy of
science, coupled with his objective knowledge ontology. The automist
methatheory he proposes for generative linguistics holds, in
contradistinction to Chomskyan psychologism, that there are such
realities, but that they are neither Platonic, nor normative in nature.
Rather, they belong properly to Popper's category of objective
knowledge. Linguistic Realities is a major contribution to the
philosophy and methodology of linguistics. Its application of Popperian
philosophy of science to the philosophy of linguistics will arouse much
debate among philosophers and linguists alike.