Napoleon was not less original as a tactician than as a strategist. His
manoeuvres on the field of battle had the promptness and decision of the
thunderbolt. In the actual shock of conflict, as in the preparations
which he made for bringing it on, his object was to amuse the enemy upon
many points, while he oppressed one by an unexpected force of numbers.
The breaking through the line, the turning of a flank, which had been
his object from the commencement of the fight, lay usually disguised
under a great number of previous demonstrations, and was not attempted
until both the moral and physical force of the enemy was impaired by the
length of the combat. It was at this period that he brought up his
guards, who, impatient of inactivity, had been held in readiness for
hours, and now, springing forward like wolf-dogs from the leash, had the
glorious task, in which they rarely failed, of deciding the
long-sustained contest. It may be added, as further characteristic of
his tactics, that he preferred employing the order of the column to that
of the line; perhaps on account of the faith which he might rest in the
extreme valour of the French officers by whom the column was headed.