Does life have meaning? What is flourishing? How do we attain the good
life? Philosophers, and many others of us, have explored these questions
for centuries. As Eva Feder Kittay points out, however, there is a flaw
in the essential premise of these questions: they seem oblivious to the
very nature of the ways in which humans live, omitting a world of
co-dependency, and of the fact that we live in and through our bodies,
whether they are fully abled or disabled. Our dependent, vulnerable,
messy, changeable, and embodied experience colors everything about our
lives both on the surface and when it comes to deeper concepts, but we
tend to leave aside the body for the mind when it comes to philosophical
matters. Disability offers a powerful challenge to long-held
philosophical views about the nature of the good life, what provides
meaning in our lives, and the centrality of reason, as well as questions
of justice, dignity, and personhood. These concepts need not be distant
and
idealized; the answers are right before us, in the way humans interact
with one another, care for one another, and need one another--whether
they possess full mental capacities or have cognitive limitations. We
need to revise our concepts of things like dignity and personhood in
light of this important correction, Kittay argues.
This is the first of two books in which Kittay will grapple with just
how we need to revisit core philosophical ideas in light of disabled
people's experience and way of being in the world. Kittay, an
award-winning philosopher who is also the mother to a multiply-disabled
daughter, interweaves the personal voice with the philosophical as a
critical method of philosophical investigation. Here, she addresses why
cognitive disability can reorient us to what truly matters, and
questions the centrality of normalcy as part of a good life. With
profound sensitivity and insight, Kittay examines other difficult
topics: How can we look at the ethical questions regarding prenatal
testing in light of a new appreciation of the personhood of disabled
people? What do new possibilities in genetic testing imply for
understanding disability, the family, and bioethics? How can we
reconsider the importance of care, and how does it work best? In the
process of pursuing these questions, Kittay articulates
an ethic of care, which is the ethical theory most useful for claiming
full rights for disabled people and providing the opportunities for
everyone to live joyful and fulfilling lives. She applies the lessons of
care to the controversial alteration of severely cognitively disabled
children known as the Ashley Treatment, whereby a child's growth is
halted with extensive estrogen treatment and related bodily
interventions are justified.
This book both imparts lessons that advocate on behalf of those with
significant disabilities, and constructs a moral theory grounded on our
ability to give, receive, and share care and love. Above all, it aims to
adjust social attitudes and misconceptions about life with disability.
