This study explores the theoretical relationship between Aristotle's
theory of syllogism and his conception of demonstrative knowledge. More
specifically, I consider why Aristotle's theory of demonstration
presupposes his theory of syllogism. In reconsidering the relationship
between Aristotle's two Analytics, I modify this widely discussed
question. The problem of the relationship between Aristotle's logic and
his theory of proof is commonly approached from the standpoint of
whether the theory of demonstration presupposes the theory of syllogism.
By contrast, I assume the theoretical relationship between these two
theories from the start. This assumption is based on much explicit
textual evidence indicating that Aristotle considers the theory of
demonstration a branch of the theory of syllogism. I see no textual
reasons for doubting the theoretical relationship between Aristotle's
two Analytics so I attempt to uncover here the common theoretical
assumptions that relate the syllogistic form of reasoning to the
cognitive state (i. e., knowledge), which is attained through
syllogistic inferences. This modification of the traditional approach
reflects the wider objective of this essay. Unlike the traditional
interpretation, which views the Posterior Analytics in light of
scientific practice, this study aims to lay the foundation for a
comprehensive interpretation of the Posterior Analytics, considering
this work from a metaphysical perspective. One of my major assertions is
that Aristotle's conception of substance is essential for a grasp of his
theory of demonstration in general, and of the role of syllogistic logic
in particular.
