During the first two years of World War I, Germany struggled to overcome
a crippling British blockade of its mercantile shipping lanes. With only
sixteen dreadnought-class battleships compared to the renowned British
Royal Navy's twenty-eight, the German High Seas Fleet stood little
chance of winning a direct fight. The Germans staged raids in the North
Sea and bombarded English coasts in an attempt to lure small British
squadrons into open water where they could be destroyed by submarines
and surface boats. After months of skirmishes, conflict erupted on May
31, 1916, in the North Sea near Jutland, Denmark, in what would become
the most formidable battle in the history of the Royal Navy.
In Jutland, international scholars reassess the strategies and tactics
employed by the combatants as well as the political and military
consequences of their actions. Most previous English-language military
analysis has focused on British admiral Sir John Jellicoe, who was
widely criticized for excessive caution and for allowing German vice
admiral Reinhard Scheer to escape; but the contributors to this volume
engage the German perspective, evaluating Scheer's decisions and his
skill in preserving his fleet and escaping Britain's superior force.
Together, the contributors lucidly demonstrate how both sides suffered
from leadership that failed to move beyond outdated strategies of
limited war between navies and to embrace the total war approach that
came to dominate the twentieth century. The contributors also examine
the role of memory, comparing the way the battle has been portrayed in
England and Germany. An authoritative collection of scholarship,
Jutland serves as an essential reappraisal of this seminal event in
twentieth-century naval history.
