Empiricist philosophy of science of the kind that promised truth through
method and a unification of science now lies in disarray. Arguments over
the indeterminancy of theoretical language, the inadequacy of induction,
the empirical incommensurability of competing theories, the possibility
or im- possibility of scientific progress, and the applicability of
natural science metatheory and methods to problems of human action have
allIed to a loss in confidence. As it is commonly said, the philosophy
of science is now in a "postempiricist" phase. It is a phase marked by
heated disagreement over the possibility of empirically grounded
scientific knowledge. Because the orienting assumptions of traditional
psychology had been largely derived from the early logical empiricist
program for science, the general deteriora- tion in confidence at the
philosophic level was inevitably to have repercus- sions within
psychology. The extensive ferment that has occurred within so- cial
psychology over the past decade, often termed "the crisis in social
psychology," must properly be viewed within this context. And, in cases
where criticisms of the traditional craft have been initiated on other
than philosophical grounds, traditional logical empiricist answers have
no longer been found sustaining. In effect, the science of psychology no
longer rests on a firm metatheoretical base, and the future remains very
much in the bal- ance. Within this critical period of search and
reappraisal, there are few voices that equal in significance that of
Edward Sampson.