Several factors delayed and greatly hampered the development of an
Italian medium and heavy tank during Rommel's Desert War in World War
II. The first was the strategic stance of the country, focussed on a war
against neighbouring countries such as France and Yugoslavia, and
ill-prepared for a war in the Western Desert. Since these European
countries bordered with Italy in mountainous areas, light tanks were
preferred as these were deemed much more suitable for the narrow roads
and bridges of the Alps. The failure to develop an effective operational
plan for North Africa was another factor behind the failed development
of an Italian medium tank, along with the lack of communication between
the War Department and the Ministry of the Colonies, which not only had
actual command over the Italian forces deployed in the Italian colonies
of Libya and in Italian East Africa, but was also responsible for
developing their defence plans. Furthermore, the development of the
medium tank was hampered by the limited number of Italian industries,
whose production was also heavily fragmented - hence the SPA-developed
engines, the Fiat and Ansaldo hulls and armour, the Breda and army
ordnance guns. All these factors delayed the development of the first
prototype of an Italian medium tank - the M 11 - which would only appear
in 1937 and did not enter production until 1939.
Inspired by its British and French counterparts, the M 11 / 39 was a
11-ton medium tank chiefly intended for use as an infantry tank, with
its main gun (a 37/40 gun) mounted in a casemate in the hull and its
small turret armed only with two machine guns. Actual production was
limited to only 100 samples, 76 of which were sent to Libya and the
other 24 to Eastern Africa, as production of the turret-gun-armed M 13
had started in the meantime. In June 1940, when Italy entered the war,
her armoured inventory numbered fewer than 1,500 light tanks (including
the obsolete Fiat 3000) and the 100 newly built M 11 medium tanks,
divided amongst three armoured divisions, three cavalry groups and
several independent tank battalions. Unsurprisingly, without a tank
school, the Italian armoured force lacked the necessary training and
experience in the use of tanks and AFVs, and with the tanks lacking
radio equipment, there was a widespread absence of tactical and
technical knowledge which, along with the limited effectiveness and
numbers of the available tanks, made the perfect recipe for the defeats
to come.
