At present and probably for some years to come, America's enemies are of
an irregular character. These irregular enemies necessarily wage war in
modes that are largely unconventional. In this monograph, Dr. Colin S.
Gray considers irregular warfare in the light of the general theory of
strategy and finds that that theory is fully adequate to explain the
phenomenon. Rather less adequate, Dr. Gray suggests, is the traditional
American way of war. The monograph offers a detailed comparison between
the character of irregular warfare, insurgency in particular, and the
principal enduring features of "the American way." It concludes that
there is a serious mismatch between that "way" and the kind of behavior
that is most effective in countering irregular foes. Dr. Gray poses the
question, Can the American way of war adapt to a strategic threat
context dominated by irregular enemies? He suggests that the answer is
"perhaps, but only with difficulty."