The insanity defense debate has come full circle, again. The current
round began when John Hinckley opened fire; in 1843, it was Daniel
M'Naghten who pulled the trigger; the "acts" of both would-be "insanity
acquittees" provoked the press, the populace, a President, and a Queen
to expressions of outrage, and triggered Congress, the House of Lords,
judges, jurists, psychologists, and psychiatrists to debate this most
maddening matter. "Insanity" -which has historically been surrounded by
defenses, defen- ders, and detractors-found itself once again under
siege, on trial, and undergoing rigorous cross-examination. Treatises
were written on the sub- ject, testimony was taken, and new rules and
laws were adopted. The dust has settled, but it has not cleared. What is
clear to me is that we have got it wrong, once again. The "full circle"
analogy and historical parallel to M'Naghten (1843) warrant some
elaboration. Hinckley's firing at the President, captured by television
and rerun again and again, rekindled an old debate regarding the
allegedly insane and punishment (Caplan, 1984; Maeder, 1985; Szasz,
1987), a debate in which the "insanity defense" is centrally situated.
The smolderings ignited anew when the Hinckley (1981) jury brought in
its verdict-"not guilty by reason of insanity" (NGRI).