the Logische Untersuchungen, l phenomenology has been conceived as a
substratum of empirical psychology, as a sphere comprising "imma-
nental" descriptions of psychical mental processes, a sphere compris-
ing descriptions that - so the immanence in question is understood - are
strictly confined within the bounds of internal experience. It 2 would
seem that my protest against this conception has been oflittle avail;
and the added explanations, which sharply pinpointed at least some chief
points of difference, either have not been understood or have been
heedlessly pushed aside. Thus the replies directed against my criticism
of psychological method are also quite negative because they miss the
straightforward sense of my presentation. My criticism of psychological
method did not at all deny the value of modern psychology, did not at
all disparage the experimental work done by eminent men. Rather it laid
bare certain, in the literal sense, radical defects of method upon the
removal of which, in my opinion, must depend an elevation of psychology
to a higher scientific level and an extraordinary amplification ofits
field of work. Later an occasion will be found to say a few words about
the unnecessary defences of psychology against my supposed "attacks.