Examination of how and why the British Army became a world-operating
force, able to beat varied enemies, written by acclaimed historian and
commentator Jeremy Black.
Between 1760 and 1815, British troops campaigned from Manila to
Montreal, Cape Town to Copenhagen, Washington to Waterloo. The naval
dimension of Britain's expansion has been superbly covered by a number
of excellent studies, but there has not been a single volume that does
the same for the army and, in particular, looks at how and why it became
a world-operating force, one capable of beating the Marathas as well as
the French. This book will both offer a new perspective, one that
concentrates on the global role of the army and its central part in
imperial expansion and preservation, and as such will be a major book
for military history and world history. There will be a focus on what
the army brought to power equations and how this made it a world-level
force.
The multipurpose character of the army emerges as the key point, one
seen in particular in the career of Wellington: while referred to
disparagingly by Napoleon as a 'sepoy general, ' Wellington's ability to
operate successfully in India and Europe was not only impressive but
also reflected synergies in experience and acquired skill that
characterized the British army. No other army matched this. The closest
capability was that of Russia able, in 1806-14, to defeat both the Turks
and Napoleon, but without having the transoceanic capability and
experience enjoyed by the British army. The experience was a matter in
part of debate, including over doctrine, as in the tension between the
'Americans' and 'Germans, ' a reference to fields of British campaigning
concentration during the Seven Years War. This synergy proved best
developed in the operations in Iberia in 1809-14, with logistical and
combat skills utilized in India employed in a European context in which
they were of particular value.
The book aims to further address the question of how this army was
achieved despite the strong anti-army ideology/practice derived from the
hostile response to Oliver Cromwell and to James II. Thus, perception
and politics are both part of the story, as well as the exigencies and
practicalities of conflict, including force structure, command issues,
and institutional developments. At the same time, there was no
inevitability about British success over this period, and it is
necessary to consider developments in the context of other states and,
in particular, the reasons why British forces did well and that Britain
was not dependent alone on naval effectiveness.
