In the United States at the height of the Cold War, roughly between the
end of World War II and the early 1980s, a new project of redefining
rationality commanded the attention of sharp minds, powerful
politicians, wealthy foundations, and top military brass. Its home was
the human sciences--psychology, sociology, political science, and
economics, among others--and its participants enlisted in an
intellectual campaign to figure out what rationality should mean and how
it could be deployed. How Reason Almost Lost Its Mind brings to life
the people--Herbert Simon, Oskar Morgenstern, Herman Kahn, Anatol
Rapoport, Thomas Schelling, and many others--and places, including the
RAND Corporation, the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral
Sciences, the Cowles Commission for Research and Economics, and the
Council on Foreign Relations, that played a key role in putting forth a
"Cold War rationality." Decision makers harnessed this picture of
rationality--optimizing, formal, algorithmic, and mechanical--in their
quest to understand phenomena as diverse as economic transactions,
biological evolution, political elections, international relations, and
military strategy. The authors chronicle and illuminate what it meant to
be rational in the age of nuclear brinkmanship.