As with the failed attempt to seize the Gallipoli peninsula in 1915, the
allied campaign to assist Greece against a seemingly invincible German
juggernaut was poorly conceived and probably doomed even as plans were
made to assist that country. Like any campaign, however, it holds
lessons for the contemporary student of strategy, tactics and history.
Greece presented singular geographic difficulties for the defending
forces, its mountainous defiles dictating the distribution of ports,
road and rail routes. The primitive state of the national infrastructure
did little to help a long-term defensive posture. Operations in Greece
proved to be a nightmare, particularly for logistics units, which
struggled with primitive communication systems in rugged terrain over
which the enemy enjoyed total air superiority. Poor liaison between the
Greek and Commonwealth forces did not help matters, nor was the force
deployed adequate for its task. The allies never enjoyed air
superiority, nor could they consolidate any in-depth defense in time to
be effective. The official British history of the campaign stated that
the 'British campaign on the mainland of Greece was from start to finish
a withdrawal'. Greece: February to April 1941 explores these
complexities, and mistakes through the eyes of the Australian Army
Medical Corps.
