Effective corporate governance, or the set of controls and incentives
that drive top management, originates both outside and inside the firm
and assures investors who hope to commit their capital. Essential when
buying stocks in one's own country, effective corporate governance is
even more important abroad, where information can be less reliable and
investor influence (or protection) more limited.
In this collection of articles from the Journal of Applied Corporate
Finance, more than thirty leading scholars and practitioners discuss
the possibilities and limitations of global corporate finance and
governance systems, whether in Europe and North America or in the
emerging markets of Israel, India, Korea, and South Africa. Essays
discuss the political roots of American corporate finance; the
structural and financial variations between international corporations;
control premiums and the effectiveness of corporate governance systems;
debt, folklore, and cross-country differences in financial structures;
the driving forces behind the East Asian Financial Crisis of 1997;
corporate ownership and control in India, Germany, France, and the
United Kingdom; financial and economic lessons of Italy's privatization
program; changes in Korean corporate governance; sovereign wealth funds;
and the new organization of Canadian business trusts. A special
roundtable discussion addresses shareholder activism in the U.K.