This is an expert assessment of the realities of close-quarter
infantry combat between German and Polish troops during the 1939
Blitzkrieg campaign in Poland.
The Nazi invasion of Poland in September 1939 saw mostly untested German
troops face equally inexperienced Polish forces. With the Polish senior
leadership endeavoring to hold the country's industrialized east,
Hitler's forces unleashed what was essentially a large pincer operation
intended to encircle and eliminate much of Poland's military strength.
Harnessing this initial operational advantage, the Germans were able to
attack Polish logistics, communications, and command centers, thereby
gaining and maintaining battlefield momentum. With the average infantry
soldier on both sides comparatively well-led, equipped, and transported,
vital differences in battlefield support (especially air power and
artillery), tactics, organization, and technology would make all the
difference in combat.
Featuring specially commissioned artwork, archive photography, and
battle maps, this study focuses upon three actions that reveal the
evolving nature of the 1939 campaign. The battle of Tuchola Forest (1-5
September) pitted fast-moving German forces against uncoordinated Polish
resistance, while the battle of Wizna (7-10 September) saw outnumbered
Polish forces impede the German push north-east of Warsaw. Finally, the
battle of Bzura (9-19 September) demonstrated the Polish forces' ability
to surprise the Germans operationally during a spirited counterattack
against the invaders. All three battles featured in this book cast light
on the motivation, training, tactics, and combat performance of the
fighting men of both sides in the 1939 struggle for Poland.
