"...an engaging book about a little known general who was in the thick
of strategizing on both the European and Asian fronts." -- The Sunday
Star Ledger
Like many heroes of the Second World War, General Albert C. Wedemeyer's
career has been largely overshadowed by such well-known figures as
Marshall, Patton, Montgomery, and Bradley. Wedemeyer's legacy as the
main planner of the D-Day invasion is almost completely forgotten today,
eclipsed by politics and the capriciousness of human nature.
Yet during America's preparation for the war, Wedemeyer was the primary
author of the "Victory Program" that mobilized US resources and directed
them at crucial points in order to secure victory over the Axis. In the
late 1930s he had the unique experience of being an exchange student at
the German Kriegsakademia, the Nazis' equivalent of Fort Leavenworth's
Command and General Staff School. As the only American to attend, he was
thus the only ranking officer in the US who recognized the revolutionary
tactics of Blitzkrieg once they were unleashed, and he knew how to
respond.
As US involvement in the European conflagration approached, Wedemeyer
was taken under the wing of George C. Marshall in Washington. Wedemeyer
conceived the plans for US mobilization, which was in greater gear than
realized at the time of Pearl Harbor. The Victory Program, completed in
the summer of 1941, contained actual battle plans and called for the
concentration of forces in England in preparation for an early
cross-channel invasion into France. However, to Wedemeyer's great
disappointment (reflecting Marshall's), he was not appointed to field
command in the ETO once the invasion commenced; further, he had run
afoul of Winston Churchill due to the latter's insistence on emphasizing
the Mediterranean theater in 1943.
Perhaps because of Churchill's animosity, Wedemeyer was transferred to
the Burma-China theater, where a year later he would replace General
Stilwell. Ultimately, Wedemeyer's service in the Asian theater became
far more significant, though less known. Had the US political
establishment listened to Wedemeyer's advice on China during the years
1943-48, it is possible China would not have been lost to the Communists
and would have been a functioning US ally from the start, thus
eliminating the likelihood of both the Korean and Vietnam Wars.
Despite Wedemeyer's key position at the crux of modern history, his
contributions have been overlooked in most accounts of World War II and
the Cold War beyond. In this work we gain an intimate look at a
visionary thinker who helped guide the Allies to victory in their
greatest challenge, but whose vision of the post-war world was
unfortunately not heeded.
