This book introduces game theory as a means to conceptualize, model, and
analyze cyber deception. Drawing upon a collection of deception research
from the past 10 years, the authors develop a taxonomy of six species of
defensive cyber deception. Three of these six species are highlighted in
the context of emerging problems such as privacy against ubiquitous
tracking in the Internet of things (IoT), dynamic honeynets for the
observation of advanced persistent threats (APTs), and active defense
against physical denial-of-service (PDoS) attacks. Because of its
uniquely thorough treatment of cyber deception, this book will serve as
a timely contribution and valuable resource in this active field.
The opening chapters introduce both cybersecurity in a manner suitable
for game theorists and game theory as appropriate for cybersecurity
professionals. Chapter Four then guides readers through the specific
field of defensive cyber deception. A key feature of the remaining
chapters is the development of a signaling game model for the species of
leaky deception featured in honeypots and honeyfiles. This model is
expanded to study interactions between multiple agents with varying
abilities to detect deception.
Game Theory for Cyber Deception will appeal to advanced
undergraduates, graduate students, and researchers interested in
applying game theory to cybersecurity. It will also be of value to
researchers and professionals working on cybersecurity who seek an
introduction to game theory.
