When von Neumann's and Morgenstern's Theory of Games and Economic
Behavior appeared in 1944, one thought that a complete theory of
strategic social behavior had appeared out of nowhere. However, game
theory has, to this very day, remained a fast-growing assemblage of
models which have gradually been united in a new social theory - a
theory that is far from being completed even after recent advances in
game theory, as evidenced by the work of the three Nobel Prize winners,
John F. Nash, John C. Harsanyi, and Reinhard Selten. Two of them,
Harsanyi and Selten, have contributed important articles to the present
volume. This book leaves no doubt that the game-theoretical models are
on the right track to becoming a respectable new theory, just like the
great theories of the twentieth century originated from formerly
separate models which merged in the course of decades. For social
scientists, the age of great discover- ies is not over. The recent
advances of today's game theory surpass by far the results of
traditional game theory. For example, modem game theory has a new
empirical and social foundation, namely, societal experiences; this has
changed its methods, its "rationality. " Morgenstern (I worked together
with him for four years) dreamed of an encompassing theory of social
behavior. With the inclusion of the concept of evolution in mathematical
form, this dream will become true. Perhaps the new foundation will even
lead to a new name, "conflict theory" instead of "game theory.
