The flawed leadership of the five senior military commanders in the
Italian campaign led to lost lives and squandered opportunities.
Wars never run according to plan, perhaps never more so than during the
Italian campaign, 1943-45, where necessary coordination between the
different armies added additional complexity to Allied plans. Errors in
the strategies, tactics, the coalition tensions, and operations at
campaign command level can clearly be seen in firsthand accounts of the
period. This new account examines the Italian campaign, from Sicily to
surrender in 1945, exploring the strategy, intentions, motives, plans,
and deeds. It then offers a detailed insight into the five commanders
who led the battles in Italy--the two British commanders, Montgomery and
Alexander; two American, Patton and Clark; and the leading German
commander, Field Marshal Kesselring.
Their personal notes and accounts, taken alongside archival material,
provides some surprising conclusions--Montgomery was not quite the
master of war he is portrayed as; Patton had serious flaws, exposed by
wasting men's lives to save a relative and overlooking the shooting of
prisoners of war; Clark lost lives to bolster his image; Alexander the
gentleman was far too vague to be effective as a senior leader.
Meanwhile, condemned war criminal Kesselring appears to be the most
efficient and also, like Alexander, one of the most popular leaders.
