People fight a lot. Both about objective and about subjective matters.
But while at least one party to a dispute must be wrong in a
disagreement about objective matters, it seems that both parties can be
right when it comes to subjective ones: it seems that there can be
faultless disagreements. But how is this possible? How can people
disagree with one another if they are both right? And why should they?
Over the last 15 years, various philosophers and linguists have argued
that we have to become relativists about truth to explain what is going
on. This book shows that we can dispense with relativism. It combines a
conservative semantic claim with a novel pragmatic one to develop the
superiority approach. The book discusses both classic and recent, as
well as general and debate-specific literature in philosophy and
linguistics and provides an introduction as well as an original
contribution to the recent debate on the semantics and pragmatics of
perspectival expressions.