This book focuses on economic bargaining theory. Economic bargaining
theory seeks to predict the outcomes of bargaining situations. In such
situations, govern ments, ?rms, or individuals share a mutual interest
in cooperation; however, they also have con?icting interests regarding
the terms of an agreement. A classic ex ample of such a situation is
wage bargaining between unions and employers. More commonplace examples
also exist. For instance, a discussion between partners on how to spend
an evening can be understood as a bargaining situation. Economic
bargaining theory explores the relationship between bargaining situ
ations and the outcomes of the bargaining. Economists have two primary
reasons to show interest in this relationship. The ?rst reason is that
many important human interactions, including economic interactions, are
bargaining situations. The second reason is that the understanding of
these situations may inform the economic theory of markets. The tool
utilized in this study is the mathematical theory of games. Predictions
for bargaining outcomes are developed by modeling the bargaining
situation as a strategic game and using game theoretic equilibrium
concepts in order to solve the game. In this approach, the speci?c
identi?ed bargaining outcome depends on the assumptions underlying the
model. The neoclassical and fundamental assumption is that of rational
agents--called economic men--who strive to maximize their utility based
on stable preferences.