Despite the best efforts of a number of historians, many aspects of the
ferocious struggle between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union during the
Second World War remain obscure or shrouded in myth. One of the most
persistent of these is the notion - largely created by many former
members of its own officer corps in the immediate postwar period - that
the German Army was a paragon of military professionalism and
operational proficiency whose defeat on the Eastern Front was solely
attributable to the amateurish meddling of a crazed former Corporal and
the overwhelming numerical superiority of the Red Army. A key pillar
upon which the argument of German numerical-weakness vis-à-vis the Red
Army has been constructed is the assertion that Germany was simply
incapable of providing its army with the necessary quantities of men and
equipment needed to replace its losses. In consequence, as their losses
outstripped the availability of replacements, German field formations
became progressively weaker until they were incapable of securing their
objectives or, eventually, of holding back the swelling might of the Red
Army.
This work seeks to address the notion of German numerical-weakness in
terms of Germany's ability to replace its losses and regenerate its
military strength, and assess just how accurate this argument was during
the crucial first half of the Russo-German War (June 1941-June 1943).
Employing a host of primary documents and secondary literature, it
traces the development and many challenges of the German Army from the
prewar period until the invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941. It
continues on to chart the first two years of the struggle between
Germany and the Soviet Union, with a particular emphasis upon the scale
of German personnel and equipment losses, and how well these were
replaced. It also includes extensive examinations into the host of
mitigating factors that both dictated the course of Germany's campaign
in the East and its replacement and regeneration capabilities.
In contrast to most accounts of the conflict, this study finds that
numerical-weakness being the primary factor in the defeat of the
Ostheer - specifically as it relates to the strength and condition of
the German units involved - has been overemphasized and frequently
exaggerated. In fact, Germany was actually able to regenerate its forces
to a remarkable degree with a steady flow of fresh men and equipment,
and German field divisions on the Eastern Front were usually far
stronger than the accepted narratives of the war would have one believe.
