or their surfaces can be translated without remainder into descriptions
of ob- jects that are neither material objects or surfaces of any
material object. All of these claims have historically conspired to
discredit Direct Realism. But Direct Realism can accommodate all of the
premises of the three argu- ments without admitting any of their
conclusions. Inferential perceptual knowl- edge assumes a kind of
knowledge that is not inferential. Without this assump- tion, we are
given a vicious infinite regress. But this is compatible with the fact
that any case of non-inferential knowledge has a material objeCt as its
object. The fact ofinfallible perceptual awareness fails to discredit
DireCt Realism for similar reasons. Infallibility is a characteristic,
not of the objects which we perceive, but rather of the acts by which we
perceive them. And this permits an object of such awareness to be either
material or something other than material. It does not fol- low from the
fact of infallibility that the objects of awareness must be other than
material objects. And, finally, the fact of translatability shows at
most that we either can or must simultaneously perceive material objects
and entities which are not material objects. It does not show that the
perception of the one is the same as the perception of the other. The
entire argument rests, as we shall learn, on an illicit assimilation of
the notions of sameness and equivalence.