This book examines the crisis at the famous insurance market, Lloyd's of
London, during the late twentieth century, which nearly destroyed the
300-year-old institution. While rapid structural change resulting from
system collapse is less common in insurance than in the history of other
financial services, one exception was the Lloyd's crisis. Hitherto,
explanations of the crisis have focused on the effects of catastrophic
losses and poor governance. By drawing on contemporary accounts of the
crisis, the author constructs the first comprehensive scholarly analysis
of the public and political response. The book applies theoretical
concepts from behavioural economics and economic psychology to argue
that multiple delusions of competence were at work both within and
outside the Lloyd's market. Arrogance, elitism and defence of vested
interests comprised endogenous elements of the crisis. Entrenched ideas
about the virtues of self-regulation and faith in insider experts also
played a role. The result was a misdiagnosis by both insiders and
politicians of what ailed Lloyd's and a series of reforms that failed to
address the underlying causes of its disease. This book offers a
salutary lesson from recent history about the importance of the
transparency, accountability and effective monitoring of financial
institutions. It is of interest to academics and students of economic
and financial history, business, insurance, political economy and
history.