This book studies Hume's scepticism and its roots, context, and role in
the philosopher's life. It relates how Hume wrote his philosophy in a
time of tumult, as the millennia-old metaphysical tradition that placed
humans and their cognitive abilities in an ontological framework
collapsed and gave way to one that placed the autonomy of the individual
in its center. It then discusses the birth of modernity that Descartes
inaugurated and Kant completed with his Copernican revolution that moved
philosophy from Being to the Self. It shows how modernity gave rise to a
new kind of scepticism, involving doubt not just about the adequacy of
our knowledge but about the very existence of a world independent of the
self. The book then examines how Hume faced the sceptical implications
and how his empiricism added yet another sceptical theme with the main
question being how argument can legitimize key concepts of human
understanding instinctively used in making sense of our perceptions.
Placing it firmly in a historical context, the book shows how Hume was
influenced by Pyrrhonian scepticism and how this becomes clear in Hume's
acceptance of the weakness of reason and in his emphasis on the
practical role of philosophy. As the book argues, rather than serving as
the foundation of science, in Hume's hand, philosophy became a guide to
a joyful, happy life, to a documentary of common life and to moderately
educated, entertaining conversation. This way Hume stands in strong
opposition to the (early) modern mainstream.
