It is generally believed that doing science means accumulating empirical
data with no or little reference to the interpretation of the data based
on the scientist's th- retical framework or presuppositions. Holton
(1969a) has deplored the widely accepted myth (experimenticism)
according to which progress in science is presented as the inexorable
result of the pursuit of logically sound conclusions from un- biguous
experimental data. Surprisingly, some of the leading scientists
themselves (Millikan is a good example) have contributed to perpetuate
the myth with respect to modern science being essentially empirical,
that is carefully tested experim- tal facts (free of a priori
conceptions), leading to inductive generalizations. Based on the
existing knowledge in a field of research a scientist formulates the
guiding assumptions (Laudan et al., 1988), presuppositions (Holton,
1978, 1998) and "hard core" (Lakatos, 1970) of the research program that
constitutes the imperative of presuppositions, which is not abandoned in
the face of anomalous data. Laudan and his group consider the following
paraphrase of Kant by Lakatos as an important guideline: philosophy of
science without history of science is empty. Starting in the 1960s, this
"historical school" has attempted to redraw and replace the positivist
or logical empiricist image of science that dominated for the first half
of the twentieth century. Among other aspects, one that looms large in
these studies is that of "guiding assumptions" and has considerable
implications for the main thesis of this monograph (Chapter 2).
