This book proposes an explicit recognition of criminology as a moral
science: a philosophically textured appreciation of the presence and
role of values in people's reasoning and motivation, set within an
empirically rigorous social-scientific account. This endeavour
requires input from both criminologists and philosophers, and careful
dialogue between them. Criminology as a Moral Science provides such a
dialogue, not least about the so-called 'fact-value distinction', but
also about substantive topics such as guilt and shame.
The book also provides philosophically-informed accounts of morality in
practice in several criminological contexts: these include
whistleblowing practices within a police service; the dilemmas of
mothers about who and what to tell about a partner's imprisonment; and
how persistent offenders begin to try to 'turn their lives around' to
desist from crime. The issues raised go to the heart of some currently
pressing topics within criminology, notably the development of
'evidence-based practice', which requires some kind of stable bridge to
be built between research evidence ('facts') and proposals for policy
('evaluative recommendations').