Industrial organization considers strategic behavior of firms in the
product market. Firms compete in prices and invest in innovation
activities in order to gain market shares. In this book I will
investigate the financial decisions of innovative firms if financial
markets are imperfect due to asymmetric information. I will demonstrate
how financial market imperfections interact with strategic competition
of firms in the product market. The tool to analyze these strategic
interactions is non- cooperative game theory. This book was written
while I was assistant professor at the department of economic theory at
the University of Tlibingen. I wish to thank my supervisor Manfred
Stadler for having suggested this interesting research subject. He
introduced me to the exciting field of industrial organization and the
economics of information. As my supervisor, he gave me great freedom to
pursue my research. I would like to thank my colleagues Jiirgen Volkert,
Andreas Scheuerle, Stephan Hornig, RUdiger Wapler and Leslie Neubecker
for the nice and friendly atmosphere at our office. Katharina Wichert,
Frank Breitling, Andrea Schrage, Stephan Gobel, Christina Schumacher,
Alexandra Zaby, Tina Bach-Adetunji and Vanessa Steinmeier provided
valuable research assistance. I am grateful to Werner Neus for being my
second supervisor. He showed me that the department of banking and
business administration and the department of economic theory share
common views on financial markets under asymmetric information.