Each of us, right now, is having a unique conscious experience. Nothing
is more basic to our lives as thinking beings and nothing, it seems, is
better known to us. But the ever-expanding reach of natural science
suggests that everything in our world is ultimately physical. The
challenge of fitting consciousness into our modern scientific worldview,
of taking the subjective "feel" of conscious experience and showing that
it is just neural activity in the brain, is among the most intriguing
explanatory problems of our times.
In this book, Josh Weisberg presents the range of contemporary responses
to the philosophical problem of consciousness. The basic philosophical
tools of the trade are introduced, including thought experiments
featuring Mary the color-deprived super scientist and fearsome
philosophical "zombies". The book then systematically considers the
space of philosophical theories of consciousness. Dualist and other
"non-reductive" accounts of consciousness hold that we must expand our
basic physical ontology to include the intrinsic features of
consciousness. Functionalist and identity theories, by contrast, hold
that with the right philosophical stage-setting, we can fit
consciousness into the standard scientific picture. And "mysterians"
hold that any solution to the problem is beyond such small-minded
creatures as us.
Throughout the book, the complexity of current debates on consciousness
is handled in a clear and concise way, providing the reader with a fine
introductory guide to the rich philosophical terrain. The work makes an
excellent entry point to one of the most exciting areas of study in
philosophy and science today.
