Zero-knowledge proofs are fascinating and extremely useful constructs.
Their fascinating nature is due to their seemingly contradictory
de?nition; ze- knowledge proofs are convincing and yet yield nothing
beyond the validity of the assertion being proved. Their applicability
in the domain of cryptography is vast; they are typically used to force
malicious parties to behave according to a predetermined protocol. In
addition to their direct applicability in cr- tography, zero-knowledge
proofs serve as a good benchmark for the study of
variousproblemsregardingcryptographicprotocols(e.g.,"securecomposition
of protocols"). A fundamental question regarding zero-knowledge
protocols refers to the preservation of security (i.e., of the
zero-knowledge feature) when many - stances are executed concurrently,
and in particular under a purely as- chronous model. The practical
importance of this question, in the days of extensive Internet
communication, seems clear. It turned out that this qu- tion is also
very interesting from a theoretical point of view. In particular, this
question served as a benchmark for the study of the security of
concurrent executions of protocols and led to the development of
techniques for coping with the problems that arise in that setting.