How access to resources and policymaking powers determines the balance
of power between the legislative and executive branches
The specter of unbridled executive power looms large in the American
political imagination. Are checks and balances enough to constrain
ambitious executives? Checks in the Balance presents a new theory of
separation of powers that brings legislative capacity to the fore,
explaining why Congress and state legislatures must possess both the
opportunities and the means to constrain presidents and governors--and
why, without these tools, executive power will prevail.
Alexander Bolton and Sharece Thrower reveal how legislative
capacity--which they conceive of as the combination of a legislature's
resources and policymaking powers--is the key to preventing the
accumulation of power in the hands of an encroaching executive. They
show how low-capacity legislatures face difficulties checking the
executive through mechanisms such as discretion and oversight, and how
presidents and governors unilaterally bypass such legislative
adversaries to impose their will. When legislative capacity is high,
however, the legislative branch can effectively stifle executives.
Bolton and Thrower draw on a wealth of historical evidence on
congressional capacity, oversight, discretion, and presidential
unilateralism. They also examine thousands of gubernatorial executive
orders, demonstrating how varying capacity in the states affects
governors' power.
Checks in the Balance affirms the centrality of legislatures in
tempering executive power--and sheds vital new light on how and why they
fail.
