Relevant to, and drawing from, a range of disciplines, the chapters in
this collection show the diversity, and applicability, of research in
Bayesian argumentation. Together, they form a challenge to philosophers
versed in both the use and criticism of Bayesian models who have largely
overlooked their potential in argumentation. Selected from contributions
to a multidisciplinary workshop on the topic held in Sweden in 2010, the
authors count linguists and social psychologists among their number, in
addition to philosophers. They analyze material that includes real-life
court cases, experimental research results, and the insights gained from
computer models.
The volume provides, for the first time, a formal measure of subjective
argument strength and argument force, robust enough to allow advocates
of opposing sides of an argument to agree on the relative strengths of
their supporting reasoning. With papers from leading figures such as
Michael Oaksford and Ulrike Hahn, the book comprises recent research
conducted at the frontiers of Bayesian argumentation and provides a
multitude of examples in which these formal tools can be applied to
informal argument. It signals new and impending developments in
philosophy, which has seen Bayesian models deployed in formal
epistemology and philosophy of science, but has yet to explore the full
potential of Bayesian models as a framework in argumentation. In doing
so, this revealing anthology looks destined to become a standard
teaching text in years to come.
