Battle for Cassinga is written as a firsthand account by an ordinary
South African paratrooper who was at the 1978 assault on the Angolan
headquarters of PLAN, the armed wing of SWAPO. The book relates why the
South African government took the political risk in attacking the
fortress in an external operation and examines the SWAPO claims that
Cassinga was a refugee camp guarded by a few PLAN soldiers. It also
explains why Sam Nujoma the SWAPO leader had no option but to perpetuate
this falsehood.
The battle, although a resounding success, suffered some setbacks which
could have been disastrous to the South African paratroopers had they
not maintained the initiative. The improvisations made by the commander
Col Jan Breytenbach ensured that a flawed jump and poor intelligence did
not adversely affect the outcome. The unforeseen Soviet-made
anti-aircraft guns used against both aircraft and ground troops
threatened to derail the attack. An appearance of a large column of
armor manned by Cubans from the nearby town of Techamutete, when half
the South African force had already left the battleground, placed the
remaining lightly armed paratroopers in mortal danger. The landmines
laid by the South Africans, together with the brave actions of the South
African Air Force pilots saved the day, allowing the remaining forces to
withdraw safely.
Battle for Cassinga looks at all the players in a critical light. SWAPO
and PLAN, the SADF and the commanders from both sides, Dimo Amaambo of
PLAN and Jan Breytenbach of the SADF as well as the brave soldiers from
both sides who fought for their political ideologies but perhaps, more
importantly, for their own band of brothers.
