One of the lessons learned from the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-9 is
that minimum capital requirements are a necessary but inadequate
safeguard for the stability of an intermediary. Despite the high levels
of capitalization of many banks before the crisis, they too experienced
serious difficulties due to insufficient liquidity buffers. Thus, for
the first time, after the GFC regulators realized that liquidity risk
can jeopardize the orderly functioning of a bank and, in some cases, its
survival. Previously, the risk did not receive the same attention by
regulators at the international level as other types of risk including
credit, market, and operational risks. The GFC promoted liquidity risk
to a significant place in regulatory reform, introducing uniform
international rules and best practices. The literature has studied the
potential effects of the new liquidity rules on the behaviour of banks,
the financial system, and the economy as a whole.
This book provides a comprehensive understanding of the bank liquidity
crisis that occurred during the GFC, of the liquidity regulatory reform
introduced by the Basel Committee with the Basel III Accord, and its
implications both at the micro and macroeconomic levels. Università
Cattolica del Sacro Cuore contributed to the funding of this research
project and its publication.