Many social or economic conflict situations can be modeled by specifying
the alternatives on which the involved parties may agree, and a special
alternative which summarizes what happens in the event that no agreement
is reached. Such a model is called a bargaining game, and a
prescription assigning an alternative to each bargaining game is called
a bargaining solution. In the cooperative game-theoretical approach,
bargaining solutions are mathematically characterized by desirable
properties, usually called axioms. In the noncooperative approach,
solutions are derived as equilibria of strategic models describing an
underlying bargaining procedure.
Axiomatic Bargaining Game Theory provides the reader with an
up-to-date survey of cooperative, axiomatic models of bargaining,
starting with Nash's seminal paper, The Bargaining Problem. It
presents an overview of the main results in this area during the past
four decades. Axiomatic Bargaining Game Theory provides a chapter on
noncooperative models of bargaining, in particular on those models
leading to bargaining solutions that also result from the axiomatic
approach.
The main existing axiomatizations of solutions for coalitional
bargaining games are included, as well as an auxiliary chapter on the
relevant demands from utility theory.