These proceedings present the technical contributions to the First
Conference on A- tions, Market Mechanisms, and Their Applications
(AMMA), held May 8-9, 2009 in Boston, Massachusetts, USA. The conference
was devoted to issues that arise in all stages of deploying a market
mechanism to solve a problem, including theoretical and empirical
examinations. In addition to more traditional academic papers, the conf-
ence placed emphasis on experiences from the real world, including case
studies and new applications. The main goal of AMMA was to explore the
synergy required for good mechanism design. This includes an
understanding of the economic and game-theoretic issues, the ability to
design protocols and algorithms for realizing desired outcomes, and the
knowledge of specific institutional details that are important in
practical applications. We were lucky enough to attract papers and talks
from economists and computer scientists, theorists and empiricists,
academics and practitioners. The program, as reflected in these
proceedings, ranged from fundamental theory on auctions and m- kets to
empirical design and analysis of matching mechanisms,
peer-to-peer-systems, and prediction markets.