This is the first book to examine the concept of anti-access and area
denial warfare, providing a definitive introduction to both conceptual
theories and historical examples of this strategy. Also referred to by
the acronym "A2/AD," anti-access warfare has been identified in American
strategic planning as the most likely strategy to be employed by the
People's Republic of China or by the Islamic Republic of Iran in any
future conflict with the United States. While previous studies of the
subject have emphasized the effects on the joint force and, air forces
in particular, this important new study advances the understanding of
sea power by identifying the naval roots of the development of the
anti-access concept. The study of anti-access or area denial strategies
for use against American power projection capabilities has strong naval
roots-which have been largely ignored by the most influential
commentators. Sustained long-range power projection is both a unique
strength of U.S. military forces and a requirement for an activist
foreign policy and forward defense. In more recent years, the logic of
the anti-access approach has been identified by the Department of
Defense as a threat to this U.S. capability and the joint force. The
conclusions in Anti-Access Warfare differ from most commentary on
anti-access strategy. Rather than a technology-driven post-Cold War
phenomenon, the anti-access approach has been a routine element of grand
strategy used by strategically weaker powers to confront stronger powers
throughout history. But they have been largely unsuccessful when
confronting a stronger maritime power. Although high technology weapons
capabilities enhance the threat, they also can be used to mitigate the
threat. Rather than arguing against reliance on maritime
forces-presumably because they are no longer survivable-the historical
analysis argues that maritime capabilities are key in "breaking the
great walls" of countries like Iran and China.
