In early 1965 the United States unleashed the largest sustained aerial
bombing campaign since World War II, against North Vietnam. Through an
ever escalating onslaught of destruction, Operation Rolling Thunder
intended to signal America's unwavering commitment to its South
Vietnamese ally in the face of continued North Vietnamese aggression,
break Hanoi's political will to prosecute the war, and bring about a
negotiated settlement to the conflict. It was not to be. Against the
backdrop of the Cold War and fears of widening the conflict into a
global confrontation, Washington policy makers micromanaged and
mismanaged the air campaign and increasingly muddled strategic
objectives and operational methods that ultimately sowed the seeds of
failure, despite the heroic sacrifices by U.S. Air Force and Navy pilots
and crews
Despite flying some 306,000 combat sorties and dropping 864,000 tons of
ordnance on North Vietnam - 42 per cent more than that used in the
Pacific theater during World War II - Operation Rolling Thunder failed
to drive Hanoi decisively to the negotiating table and end the war. That
would take another four years and another air campaign. But by building
on the hard earned political and military lessons of the past, the Nixon
Administration and American military commanders would get another chance
to prove themselves when they implemented operations Linebacker I and II
in May and December 1972\ And this time the results would be vastly
different.
