The idea behind this book is that developing a conception of the
physical world and a conception of mind is impossible without the
exercise of agency, meaning "the power to alter at will one's perceptual
inputs". The thesis is derived from a philosphical account of the role
of agency in knowledge.; The book is divided into three parts. In Part
One, the author argues that "purely representational" theories of mind
and of mental development have been overvalued, thereby clearing the
ground for the book's central thesis. In Part Two, he proposes that,
because objective experience depends upon the experience of agency, the
development of the "object concept" in human infants is grounded in the
development of executive-attentional capacities. In Part Three, an
analysis of the links between agency and self-awareness generates an
original theory of the nature of certain stage-like transitions in
mental functioning and of the relationship between executive and
mentalizing defects in autism.; The book should be of interest to
students and researchers in cognitive- developmental psychology, to
philosophers of mind, and to anybody with an interest in cognitive
science.