Recently, the salient idea of personhood in the tradition of African
philosophy has been objected to on various grounds. Two such objections
stand out - the book deals with a lot more. The first criticism is that
the idea of personhood is patriarchal insofar as it elevates the status
of men and marginalises women in society. The second criticism observes
that the idea of personhood is characterised by speciesism. The essence
of these concerns is that personhood fails to embody a robust
moral-political view.
African Personhood and Applied Ethics offers a philosophical
explication of the ethics of personhood to give reasons why we should
take it seriously as an African moral perspective that can contribute to
global moral-political issues. The book points to the two facets that
constitute the ethics of personhood - an account of (1) moral perfection
and (2) dignity. It then draws on the under-explored view of dignity qua
the capacity for sympathy inherent in the moral idea of personhood to
offer a unified account of selected themes in applied ethics,
specifically women, animal and development.