It is somewhat surprising to find out how little serious theorizing
there is in philosophy (and in social psychology as well as sociology)
on the nature of social actions or joint act. hons in the sense of
actions performed together by several agents. Actions performed by
single agents have been extensively discussed both in philosophy and in
psycho ogy. There is, ac- cordingly, a booming field called action
theory in philosophy but it has so far strongly concentrated on actions
performed by single agents only. We of course should not forget game
theory, a discipline that systematically studies the strategic interac-
tion between several rational agents. Yet this important theory, besides
being restricted to strongly rational acting, fails to study properly
several central problems related to the concep- tual nature of social
action. Thus, it does not adequately clarify and classify the various
types of joint action (except perhaps from the point of view of the
agents' utilities). This book presents a systematic theory of social
action. Because of its reliance on so-called purposive causation and
generation it is called the purposive-causal theory. This work also
discusses several problems related to the topic of social action, for
instance that of how to create from this perspective the most central
concepts needed by social psychology and soci- ology. While quite a lot
of ground is covered in the book, many important questions have been
left unanswered and many others unasked as well.