The publication of this clinically analytical and trenchantly insightful
volume is felicitously timed. By fortuitous coincidence, it comes at a
time when the Chicago School enjoys a high-water mark of acceptance in
U.S. legal circles, and at a time when the U.S. merger movement of the
1980s is cresting. It provides a welcome warning against the dangers of
translating abstract theories, based on highly restrictive (and
unrealistic) assumptions, into facile public policy recommendations. As
such the Schmidt/Rittaler study serves as a needed antidote to the
currently fashionable predilection to confuse ideology with science. In
the Chicago lexicon, the only appropriate policy toward business is a
policy of untrammeled laissez-faire. Because there are no market
imperfec- tions (other than government-created or trade-union-generated
monopolies), the market can be trusted to regulate economic activity,
inexorably meting out appropriate rewards and punishments. In this ideal
world, corporate size and power can be safely ignored. After all,
corporations become big only only because they are efficient, only
because they are productive, only because they have served consumers
better than their rivals, and only because no newcomers are good enough
to challenge their dominance. Once an industrial giant becomes lethargic
and no longer bestows its productive beneficence on society, it will
inevitably wither and eventually die. This is the "natural law" that
governs economic life. It demands obedience to its rules. It tolerates
no interference by the state.